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ABSTRACT
This study uniquely addresses declining business profitability
because of a lack of coordinated meetings between the public
and private sectors. We determine optimal meeting frequency
(i.e., the highest number of regularly scheduled meetings of the
Standing Committee of the inter-agency coordination per year at
which profit can be maximised) for poorly functioning public–pri-
vate partnership (PPP) industries (i.e., their average return on
assets or ROA < 0). The tourism industry in emerging countries
such as Laos provides an example of a PPP. Using two-person
Nash bargaining theory and given budget constraints, we find
that the government should conduct bimonthly meetings to
improve PPP industry competitiveness. We believe that our study
makes a significant contribution to the literature because few
emerging studies use mathematical models to address the
problem of public and private sector meeting frequency and
collaboration.
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Inter-agency coordination can be ‘a vehicle for change’; that is, the concerning agen-
cies should be ready to make adjustments to ensure customer satisfaction (Beatrice,
1991). This is to sustain business profitability and PPP industry competitiveness1. For
the tourism industry, although the industry is profit-driven, inter-agency coordination
between public and private sector entities is required to cultivate the country’s
brand image.
We consider the case of inter-agency coordination in the tourism industry in
emerging countries such as Laos. Based on Lao Tourism Development Strategy 2006
to 2020 (Lao National Tourism Administration, 2006) with special reference to a pub-
lic–private partnership (PPP)2 and Porter’s (1990) Diamond Model3, we identify fac-
tors that lead to success with PPP industry strategies and investigate the underlying
cause of weaknesses in those strategies. Specifically, a collaborative effort has been
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launched by the Lao government targeted at the public and private sector because,
according to the Lao National Tourism Administration, (2006), there is currently
minimal cohesion among sectors. In fact, the government’s coordinated efforts to
improve social welfare4 (Elster, 1982) and tourism competitiveness have been sabo-
taged by a lack of collaboration between the public and private sectors (Lao National
Tourism Administration, 2006). This poor inter-agency coordination also explains the
main motivation of this study. However, coordination requires infrastructure such as
meeting facilities, budget, and management committees (Patrick, Madeleine, & Alan,
2000). An applicable example is the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing
Committee, which represents the infrastructure for humanitarian aid coordination
(Gostin et al., 2016).
Additionally, the literature documents that meetings can resolve many problems in
organisations (Shin & Higa, 2005) including poor inter-agency coordination. Optimal
meeting frequency (i.e., the highest value for the meeting frequency at which profit
can be maximised) applies to the study of how meeting frequency (i.e., the number
of regularly scheduled meetings of the Standing Committee of the inter-agency coord-
ination per year) could improve poor coordination among agencies. Essentially, face-
to-face meetings are more efficient than attempting to discuss and resolve problems
via email (Shin & Higa, 2005); however, they can be difficult to coordinate because of
participants, locations, and schedules (Larsen, Urry, & Axhausen, 2008). This study,
therefore, focuses on routine administration and investigates the number of standing
committee meetings per year that occur with respect to inter-agency coordination in
the PPP industry. In this study, the number of the firm’s audit committee meetings
with external auditors per year (Yin, Gao, Li, & Lv, 2012) and the number of board
meetings per year (Baccouche, Hadriche, & Omri, 2014) are used as a proxy for
meeting frequency hð Þ.
We show that the evidence concerning h can affect firm profitability (via the
return on assets, or ROA, see equation 1ð Þ). Accordingly, h has strong correlation
with a poorly functioning company and PPP industry (i.e., their average ROA < 0).
In other words, the more active the standing committee is in inter-agency coordin-
ation, the poorer the measure of PPP industry performance. Many accounting firms
observe three or four audit committee meetings5 per year (Yin et al., 2012).
Moreover, according to Xinhua news,
‘the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China will convene an
entrepreneurship and innovation conference with up to two plenary sessions a year in
order to coordinate government measures to tackle major problems, tighten supervision,
and mend communication between the public and private sectors’. 6
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the United States has eight regu-
lar meetings per year (Aadland & Sterbenz, 2015). Should we accept the current prac-
tices for the meeting frequency, or should we consider another option that is based
on the solution obtained in this study?
We identify optimal meeting frequency hð Þ based on game theory and bargaining
theory. Specifically, based on the negative relationship between h and ROA
(Baccouche et al., 2014) as shown in equation 1ð Þ, we apply two-person Nash bar-
gaining to determine h. The first player is represented by the government authority
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(player G) that is striving to improve national PPP industry competitiveness. The
second player is the firm in the de facto industry (player i). We emphasise that player
i’s average ROA can play a significant role in determining h. Unexpectedly, our
results disagree with the recommendations of the NDRC (i.e., semi-annual meetings),
the FOMC (i.e., eight coordinated meetings per year), and accounting firms (i.e.,
three to four meetings annually). This study, therefore, highlights the calling for
change in inter-agency coordination based on h for the PPP industry and also
other industries.
The main contributions of this paper include the following. First, we propose a
two-person Nash bargaining equilibrium model considering budget constraints based
on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and seeking h. Second, we emphasise that ROA can
play a significant role in determining h by analysing and discussing specific cases.
Finally, this study analyses two types of equilibria. The first is the two-person Nash
bargaining equilibrium (i.e., Equation 4), which captures the optimal meeting fre-
quency given the budget constraints. The second is the Bayesian Nash equilibria (i.e.,
Equations 6:1 and 6:2), which propose that the relevant government authority
imposes measures to improve a poorly functioning PPP industry.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the motiv-
ation for our analysis of the bargaining problem and optimal meeting frequency.
Section 3 shows the extensive form of the two-person bargaining problem. After
determining the optimal meeting frequency, Section 4 discusses the implications of
the findings. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions of our study.
2. Background and recent literature
The existing literature related to this study focuses on regularly scheduled meetings.
However, research on regularly scheduled meetings using mathematical models has
only begun to appear very recently, for example, Aadland and Sterbenz (2015). With
respect to efficiency benefits, regular meetings achieve higher efficiency than emer-
gency meetings since regular meetings allow participants more time to parse the
meeting content (Aadland & Sterbenz, 2015). However, we do not address emergency
operations and meetings because they are beyond the scope of this study. We refer to
the literature related to inter-agency coordination during emergency and disaster
management such as Aros & Gibbons, 2018; Curnin, Owen, Paton, & Brooks, 2015;
Peter, Karen, & Gy€ongyi, 2017; Steven, Christine, Douglas, Cain, & David, 2015.
A crucial factor that influences optimal meeting frequency is the threshold value.
Aadland and Sterbenz (2015)’s threshold is determined by random distribution across
optimal policy (e.g., the quantity changes based on oil prices and oil inventories, or
the changes that occur when OPEC imposes quotas) and by inventory models.
However, our threshold is raised by budget constraints and shadow prices based on
two-person Nash bargaining. Therefore, our study fills the gap in the literature con-
cerning regularly scheduled meetings.
We chose to conduct an analysis of a bargaining problem and h (i.e., an optimal
solution) because our methodology is based on game theory. Game theory is com-
posed of three main features including players7, strategic moves, and outcomes. Elster
(1982) noted that game theory respects decisions made by rational and interacting
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players and is useful in the study of social and structural behaviour. Second, using
game theory, we aim to solve a practical problem concerning poor coordination
between a poorly functioning PPP industry (e.g., the tourism industry in Laos) and
the related government authority.
In solving the problem of poor inter-agency coordination when deciding whether
to determine optimal meeting frequency, we consider the potential beneficiaries; the
tourism industry in Laos and in emerging countries, the accounting firms, the
FOMC, and the NDRC are among suitable recipients. Consider, for example, that
China has recently launched an effort to improve unproductive factories8.
Consequently, several factories face a high risk of market reforms; otherwise, that of
closure. Thus, the NDRC can influence the PPP industry’s low or decreased product-
ivity by using optimal meeting frequency.
2.1. Finding the optimal meeting frequency h
Unlike other empirical studies (Baccouche et al., 2014; Greco, 2011; Sharma, Naiker,
& Lee, 2009; Yin et al., 2012), this study determines h for inter-agency coordination
in the PPP industry. However, hypothetical questions abound as to whether h can
be determined by the recommendations of accounting firms (Yin et al., 2012), the
majority decision (Shin & Higa, 2005), or the negotiable result of relevant players?
The latter is the focus of this study.
First, we address the link between h and company profitability based on
Baccouche et al. (2014) and Yin et al. (2012). Let h 2 1; 11½ , where the value of 1 and
11 refer to the minimum and maximum meeting frequencies per year, respectively
(Yin et al., 2012). Note that if the maximum meeting frequency (h ¼ 11 or monthly
meeting) is observed, then the budget constraint can never be imposed. However, the
opposite is the case in this study. That is, we assume that budget constraints are one
decisive factor in the coordination (Patrick et al., 2000) including the inter-agency
coordination. Additionally, let Ri denote the average ROA in the PPP industry or
player i (Baccouche et al., 2014). Specifically, h has a negative relationship with Ri
(Baccouche et al., 2014); that is, ht ¼ a1  b1Rit1 where a1 & b1 are coefficients at
time t. For mathematical simplicity, regardless of time, we also assume that
hþ b1Ri  0 (1)
Second, although Baccouche et al. (2014) help us to formulate the linearisation of
h as shown in equation 1ð Þ, we still lack its optimality feature or h. This requires
multi-player decision making (Basar & Jan, 1999) since the inter-agency coordination
in the PPP industry is a multi-person game. The feature is, therefore, a Nash equilib-
rium (Basar & Jan, 1999) or the Pareto optimal (Elster, 1982). Additionally, we see
the distinction between inter-agency coordination and PPP as follows.
2.2. Inter-agency coordination versus the public-private partnership
Based on Wang, Xiong, Wu, and Zhu (2018), in addition to ensuring coordination, a
PPP is a mutual agreement (i.e., mutual benefits for the partners involved) and often
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includes a joint program. Infrastructure investments are an example of PPP.
However, inter-agency coordination/cooperation is one form of PPP (Lindsay,
McQuaid, & Dutton, 2008). A good example is the Ministry of Defence’s ‘towers of
excellence’ communities of practice that have been created in Britain whereby policy
makers learn from scientific community exchanges of know-how (Merindol, 2005).
Additionally, inter-agency coordination incorporates distinctive elements including
psychological benefits as it has governance structure (Martin, 2016). That is, inter-
agency coordination collectively facilitates the decision-making process (Wang et al.,
2018) and also combines three ingredients of coordination: social interaction,
resource sharing, and political economy outlooks (Farmakopoulou, 2002). Last, inter-
agency coordination can tackle all issues concerning public administration (Li &
Chan, 2009) including PPP industry competitive disadvantages.
3. Model
3.1. How players interact
Consider Figure 1. As a first step, if players of the game are faced with an opportun-
ity, player i chooses to open a business given their optimistic expectations (Guardner,
2003). As a second step, player i now has two choices – whether to propose meeting
frequency to the government authority or not. For example, according to Yin et al.
(2012), player i proposes three or four meetings per year9. The meeting frequency
game can be solved by sub-game perfect equilibrium (Myerson, 1997). Specifically,
player G’s decision can influence the outcome of the game based on backward induc-
tion. Note that the first payoff belongs to player i and the second payoff to player G.
In principle, one of player G’s decision criteria are to optimise meeting frequency
i:e: 11hð Þ. Similarly, player i’s proposal is also to maximise meeting frequency
i:e: hð Þ. As with a game that has perfect information, the solution of the game is to
obtain the optimal payoff or the point ðh; 11 hÞ. However, the disagreement point
is the payoff ð1; 1Þ, which is the minimum meeting frequency. Therefore, this study
attempts to tackle a bargaining problem about the meeting frequency between player
Figure 1. The extensive form of the two-person bargaining game
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i and player G regardless of bargaining power10. In other words, this game uses com-
plete information.
3.2. Budget constraints
In this study, player i’s budget constraints (Bi) become
hRi  Bi (2)
3.3. An optimal condition and the objective function
The optimised solution is typically composed of maximising or minimising an objective
function. For example, we choose input values and compute optimal values of the func-
tion by using the first-order and second-order derivatives of the objective function11.
Additionally, a usual definition of the bargaining problem is to seek an optimal solu-
tion. Therefore, our objective function concerns the Nash bargaining problem
(Maschler, Solan, & Zamir, 2013). Specifically, the negotiation basis of the meeting fre-
quency is mutually helpful if and only if 1  h  11. Given the two constraints in
equations 1ð Þ and 2ð Þ, our objective function is to maximise a Lagrange function:
L ¼ 11h1ð Þ h1ð Þ þ k1 hþ b1Rið Þ þ k2 BihRið Þ (3)
where k ¼ k1 ¼ k2 are the shadow price (Chiang & Wainwright, 2005) or the
Lagrange multipliers (Sayama, Fan, & Fan, 1976). To conclude our results, the
shadow price acts as ‘a judge’s decision’, which can influence desired or undesired
outcomes. However, this interpretation is not new. For example, Sayama et al. (1976)
examined how to find feasible solutions based on the shadow prices. Finally, we use
the notation shown in Table 1. Additionally, equation 3ð Þ represents the Nash equi-
librium depicted by the highest point in curves in Figure 2. The analytical factors in
Figure 2 are provided in Table 2.
4. Solution and discussion
In this section, we analyse the bargaining game, and the Nash solution is central
to our analysis. We note that most optimisation problems within a constraint
possess the direct objective function property (Chiang & Wainwright, 2005). We
seek the maximised or minimised values of a given set of parameters by using
the Lagrange method. Specifically, in the non-linear setting of this study we use
Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are similar to the Lagrange method (Chiang &
Wainwright, 2005).
Table 1. Main notation used in the study.
h The meeting frequency or the regularly scheduled meetings for inter-agency coordination in the PPP industry
(i.e., the number of meetings between public and private sectors per year).
Ri The average ROA in the PPP industry or player i.
Bi The player i’s budget constraints.
k The shadow price of the optimal h
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4.1. Theorem. In the two-person bargaining game, the meeting frequency achieves its
optimal negotiating solution if and only if
h ¼ 5:5 kRi
2
(4)
Proof. The first-order necessary condition of the two endogenous variables h, and Ri
of the objective function (equation 3ð Þ) are the following:
For the case of h, we find
Lh ¼ 11 2hþ k1  k2Ri
For the case of Ri, we find
LRi ¼ k1b1  k2h
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Chiang & Wainwright, 2005) are
Lh ¼ 11 2hþ k1  k2Ri  0 h  0 hLh ¼ 0
LRi ¼ k1b1  k2h  0 Ri  0 RiLRi ¼ 0
Lk1 ¼ hþ b1Ri  0 k1  0 k1Lk1 ¼ 0
Lk2 ¼ Bi  hRi  0 k2  0 k2Lk2 ¼ 0
We use a trial and error method to solve the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Step 1: We
suppose that the second constraint (the budget constraint) is nonbinding in the
Figure 2. The objective function. The analytical parameter and the R-code are provided in Table 2
and Appendix B, respectively.
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solution; that is, k2 ¼ 0 by complementary slackness (Chiang & Wainwright, 2005).
We can, therefore, obtain the following equations
Lh ¼ 11 2hþ k1 ¼ 0
LRi ¼ k1b1 ¼ 0
Lk1 ¼ hþ b1Ri ¼ 0
We solve for h and yield trail answers











We see that h ¼ 5:5þ k1=2 may be profoundly satisfying the two constraints in
equations 1ð Þ and 2ð Þ.
Step 2: Similar to Step 1, we make the assumption about k1 ¼ 0, and obtain
Lh ¼ 11 2h k2Ri ¼ 0
LRi ¼ k2h ¼ 0
Lk2 ¼ Bi  hRi ¼ 0
The trail solutions are







Once again, h ¼ 5:5 k2Ri=2 can be our optimal solution. Here, we have two
potential solutions including






Since the purpose of this study is to emphasise a causal relationship between h and
Ri, we only accept h ¼ 5:5 kRi2 as the final solution to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
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4.2. Discussion
Based on Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Chiang & Wainwright, 2005), we see that k is the
shadow value of h, and k  0, which measures the rate of the change of the desired
(maximum) value of h. This represents the optimality of the meeting frequency based
on the shadow value. Specifically, the optimum condition, which is sufficient for
equation 4ð Þ, is
k ¼ 2 5:5hð ÞRi  0
Similarly,
k  0; if h
  5:5; and Ri>0 5:1ð Þ
h  5:5; and Ri<0 5:2ð Þ

We, therefore, have two sub-game perfect equilibria as optimum conditions, condi-
tions 5:1ð Þ and 5:2ð Þ. For example, if the PPP industry has the average value of
Ri > 0, then the optimal meeting frequency may not be necessary as Sharma et al.
(2009) hint that steady growth companies tend to meet less often (i.e., the condition
5:1ð Þ is satisfied). However, our study proposes that the government imposes a meas-
ure for the meeting frequency if condition 5:2ð Þ occurs (see Figure 2 and Appendix
A). Similar to the result of Baccouche et al. (2014), whenever the average value of
Ri < 0 (i.e., poorly functioning), organising coordinated meetings six times a year or
more is adequate.
In addition, the government authority (player G) can apply the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and the majority criterion to help impose the simple measure. First, the
government defines two groups of PPP industry members, such as the condition
5:1ð Þ and 5:2ð Þ, to represent the PPP industry member group one as a strong per-
former and the group-two PPP industry member as a poor performer. Let p and 1
p be the probability for group 1 and group 2, respectively. Additionally, based on
Stewart and Munro (2007), more than six meetings per year are considered unneces-
sary by experimental participants. Player G, therefore, has two choices (Bayesian
Nash equilibria):
ph  5:5; for Ri>0 as the PPP industry member group one 6:1ð Þ
5:5< 1pð Þh  6; for Ri<0 as the PPP industry member group two 6:2ð Þ

Table 2. The analytical parameters based on equation 4ð Þ:
Parameters Values Data source
Ri 0.152 to 0.266 Baccouche et al. (2014)
k 1 vs. -1
b1 3.755 Baccouche et al. (2014)
Bi 8 meetings  Ri Aadland and Sterbenz (2015)
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Next, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists if ph > 1pð Þh or p > 1=2. Based on the
government’s ‘strategic priority’ and the majority criterion, we can interpret p as, for
example, if the number of firms in the PPP industry belonging to group two (condi-
tion 6:2ð Þ) is more than half, the government should impose a measure to organise
six meetings per year to improve the PPP industry’s competitiveness.
A highly practical implication can be discussed based on the collapse of the pub-
lic-private partnership-owned dam on 23 July 2018 in Southern Laos, which caused
widespread damage and casualties12. The Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy Hydroelectric Power
Dam with 410MW capacity13 is now under construction and expects to export 90%
of the electric power to Thailand. However, the dam illustrates a perfect example of
poor inter-agency coordination. Specifically, the villagers had been alerted only three
or four hours before the Saddle dam D collapsed14 although the failure in the upper
part of the Saddle occurred 24 hours earlier15. That is, regular communication (i.e., a
meeting scheduled to occur six times a year) between the relevant parties had not
been established and caused a communication breakdown. Apparently, we may
include the under constructing PPP project as a poorly functioning one because
of Ri < 0.
This study is concerned with Nash solutions or the government political aspect
(the majority criterion). Thus, bimonthly meetings are a possible solution. However,
few countries can commit to such a policy because few countries have specific func-
tions similarly to the NDRC of China. A vital function of the NDRC16 is to ensure
greater coordination between the public and private sector. Interestingly, 10 out of 15
main tasks of the NDRC require a substantial degree of coordinated effort. As a
result, through the NDRC’s functions, imposing a measure to implement meeting fre-
quency of six times per year is a plausible scenario.
However, considering the various forms of regular meeting frequency, we provide
proof of the usefulness of optimal meeting frequency (Sharma et al., 2009) unless the
content quality of the regular meeting can be created. What is the content of the
meetings on inter-agency coordination in the PPP industry? Since 2002, a World
Bank Group flagship report on doing business17 can address the content. Specifically,
in a comparison of 190 countries, the report ranks each country according to 11 sub-
indices based on business procedure, time, and cost. If Laos is designed to achieve its
upper ranking18, then we propose convening bimonthly meetings. Additionally, based
on the lessons from the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy Hydroelectric Power Dam, installing a
warning system will be an additional content item of the regular meetings.
The quality of each meeting result is difficult to quantify. Many prolonged meet-
ings produce only few tangible outcomes (Patrick et al., 2000). However, as Vivacqua,
Garcia, and Gomes (2011) note, although holding face-to-face meetings is a challenge,
applying ‘ontology’19 to build sensory and emotional awareness of decision making
can be an alternative. Further, Clifton and Van De Mieroop (2010) examined records
of President Kennedy’s meetings on the space race against the Soviets on 21
November 1962 and found that President Kennedy applied the rhetorical notion of
ethos (i.e., topics of geo-politics, arousing ‘them and us’ polarity) to influence his
audience. In addition, Francis (1998) adopted an alternative definition of meetings in
the cross-cultural context. He found that, in Papua New Guiney, to achieve the
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objectives of meetings, participants could make a start by searching tribal rituals (i.e.,
stereotypic, quasi-dramatic, and repetitive behaviours) before convening their for-
mal meetings.
It is likely that a full investigation is required on the relevant ‘red tape’ or bureau-
cratic processes before we can offer suggestions for each government authority.
We recall the 80-20 rule20. Only 20% of enterprises contribute to 80% of economic
performance in the PPP industry. In other words, only 20% of all firms actively par-
ticipate and coordinate with government initiatives, and a lower percentage of partici-
pation is a source of governance failure (Martin, 2016). However, to encourage
enterprise participation, we can use a Hobbesian variant of social contract theory
(McCain, 2009). Specifically, if a firm is not a member of the PPP industry associ-
ation, he risks facing Hobbes’s theory ‘the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short’.
Last, the usefulness of optimal regular meeting frequency should be compared to
the usefulness of emergency meetings. Although regular meetings bear considerable
sunk costs (Aadland & Sterbenz, 2015), based on a cost-benefit analysis, the hidden
costs of emergency meetings can escalate. To illustrate, during the tsunami of Banda
Aceh, Indonesia in 2004, more than 70 emergency meetings were organised per week
(Peter et al., 2017).
5. Conclusion
An important step in battling the problem of declining business profitability is deter-
mining the optimal meeting frequency of coordinated meetings. In this paper, we
employ two-person Nash bargaining to guide players (i.e., the de facto industry and
the government authority) to agree upon a maximised meeting frequency without
side payments (i.e., contracts). Given the de facto industry’s budget constraints and
the negative average value of the ROA, we determine the highest value for meeting
frequency (i.e., six meetings per year) at which profit can be maximised. However, it
is also asked: how can the optimal meeting frequency clearly improve profits in
poorly performing PPP industries? As discussed, communication breakdown can
ensure poor inter-agency coordination. The optimal meeting frequency is designed to
solve the problem of poor inter-agency coordination. Additionally, given the meeting
frequency has a negative relationship with ROA (Baccouche et al., 2014), this optimal
meeting frequency thus helps perform the internal monitoring and evaluation, and
acts as an effective mechanism for dealing with fraud and errors in a poorly function-
ing company (Yin, Gao, Li, & Lv, 2012). In turn, we hope our results have provided
practical recommendations for improving the poorly functioning PPP industry in
emerging countries and Laos. However, this study has some limitations.
Calculating a common value for optimal meeting frequency without a binding con-
tract may be reasonable; however, it can be impractical. This is a limitation of bar-
gaining theory. In addition, like Hudson, Hardy, Henwood, and Wistow (1999), we
observe that inter-agency cooperation related to the public sector is a highly abstract
concept and not implementable. However, a cooperation solution with a binding
agreement should be applicable.
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Our optimisation method only addresses present value. Specifically, we are unable to
interpret the discount rate of future value.
Future research on company profitability concerning the meeting frequency prob-
lem will focus upon a repeated game in the dynamic setting. This will involve players
acting more than once, and the time path will play a role.
Notes
1. Industry competitiveness can be deduced from firm profitability.
2. The PPP model is also known as the incomplete contract approach.
3. Based on the Diamond Model, government strategies can influence the competitive
advantage of the national (tourism) industry.
4. We may interpret this as collective responsibility.
5. Probably, they use Robinstern bargaining to propose the meeting frequency.
6. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201508/20/c_134538876.htm
7. There can be two or more players who interact with each other and make decisions
either simultaneously or sequentially to solve the expected payoff - a form of utility – of
each player based on the (best) alternative strategies.
8. http://theconversation.com/how-chinas-skewed-sex-ratio-is-making-president-xis-job-a-
whole-lot-harder-84341
9. This bottom-up approach can be described why Player i moves first.
10. The model in this study is also tested on a case with unequal bargaining power with
identical results.
11. The optimization condition is often an abstract concept. In mathematics, we can visualise
an optimal point as the highest place on a hilltop or the lowest point in a valley.
Sometimes we call an optimization condition ‘the quest for the best’ (Chiang AC,
Wainwright K, 2005). Moreover, the optimal point on a hilltop or in a valley is called
‘local maximum or local minimum’, respectively. However, another definition exists called







16. The main functions of the NDRC can be found on the website http://en.ndrc.gov.
cn/mfndrc/.
17. http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2018
18. On 1 February 2018, the Lao Prime Minister issued decree no. 02 to improve the
business environment based on the report by having follow-up quarterly meetings.
19. The ontology is based on the analysis of a series of recorded videos.
20. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_principle
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Appendix A. The R-code of Figure A1
The R-code:
#####Figure A1 Shadow price
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lines(lm4,type¼‘l’,col¼‘4’,lty ¼ 4,lwd ¼ 2)
##
legend(‘bottomright’,legend¼ c(‘1 meeting per year’,’5.5 meetings per year’,
‘6 meetings per year’,’9 meetings per year’),
col¼ c(‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’), lty ¼ 1:4)
Appendix B. The R-code of Figure 2







Figure A1. Meeting frequency based on equation. The analytical parameters are shown in
Table A1.
Table A1. The analytical parameters based on equation 4ð Þ:
Parameters Values Data source
Ri Between  0.152 and 0.266 Baccouche et al. (2014)
k 1, 5.5, 6, and 9
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L¼(10-theta)(theta-1)þlambda(thetaþ b1R)þlambda(B-thetaR)
L














lines(L4,type¼‘l’,col¼‘4’,lty ¼ 4,lwd ¼ 2)
##
legend(‘bottom’,legend¼ c(‘shadow price > 0, ROA < 0’,’shadow price > 0, ROA > 0’,
‘shadow price < 0, ROA < 0’,’shadow price < 0, ROA > 0’),
col¼ c(‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’), lty ¼ 1:4)
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